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THE TWELFTH ROUND: WILL BOXING SAVE
ITSELF?
KATHERINE FIGUEROA*
In 2010, Sergio “Maravilla” Martinez was stripped from his WBC
middleweight title belt that was then easily handed over to a boxing
favorite. In 2015, two big promotional companies, Top Rank Inc. and
Golden Boy Promotions, filed similar claims against manager and advisor
Al Haymon accusing him of unfair and anticompetitive business practices.
These incidents make one long-standing point clear: professional boxing’s
current structure is an abyss of deception and corruption. Corruption is not
only harmful to those intended to be harmed; corruptive practices also
diminish the quality, creditability, and integrity of the sport. However,
corruption in the sport of boxing is but a novel issue. Indeed, deception
lies at the heart of the sport. Despite corruption’s persistence, there have
been many governmental attempts throughout the decades to regulate such
unlawful conduct. However, none have had much success in combating
corruption effectively.
This Note will begin by giving a brief overview of the history of
modern boxing and the many failed attempts by the federal government to
pass laws in an effort to regulate the sport. It will then analyze current
legislation, such as the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act and antitrust
laws, that govern activities in boxing. Additionally, this Note will analyze
certain proposals aimed at curtailing corruption. However, this Note will
show that lack of enforcement, partiality towards fighters, and inefficiency
has rendered these measures and proposals superfluous in regulating
boxing.

*J.D. candidate 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., History and Theological
Studies, 2014, Loyola Marymount University. I want to thank Professor Cindy Archer for her
commitment to this paper and her guidance as I struggled not only with this paper but also finding
my place in law school. I am grateful to my family who without their understanding, love, and
support throughout the years I would not be where I am today. I want to extend a special thanks
to Rob Allison, a former professor and good friend of mine, who incited my interest in boxing
and kindled my love for argumentation. Lastly, I want to thank Loyola Law School, Los Angeles
and its Entertainment Law Review Executive Board for providing a splendid environment and
opportunity to explore two interests of mine, boxing and the law.
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Nonetheless, this Note will argue that the best solution to curing
boxing’s corruptive ills is a private governing body in the form of a league.
To be effective, a solution must combat corruption on all fronts. This
means that all interests of participating parties in the sport of boxing must
be represented and protected. This way, corruption will not make its way
at the expense of the fighter or the promoter. Moreover, protection of all
interests will incentivize participants to properly police the sport. Although
it is uncontested in boxing literature that a private league is the most
effective solution, not many have spoken on how such a league would look,
operate, or combat corruption. Thus this Note will propose a model that is
predominantly based on the Professional Golf Association, the PGA of
America, and in part the National Football League and National Basketball
League.
I. INTRODUCTION
The sport of boxing is a chasm of corruption in which the law governs
but enforcement is nonexistent.
Corruptive practices by those who participate1 in the sport of boxing
are harmful to those intended to be harmed, as well as to those not intended
to be harmed, such as the fans and sport in general. These corruptive
practices deprive fans of potential matches and faith in their beloved sport.
Outsiders and potential fans look unfavorably upon the sport and are often
disgusted by the shady underlying conduct.2 Thus, these corruptive
practices not only harm individual participants but also diminish the
quality, credibility, and integrity of the sport as a whole.
An illustration of corruption’s harmful consequences is the 2010 title
strip of the World Boxing Council (“WBC”) light middleweight champion,
Sergio Martinez.3 Sergio “Maravilla” Martinez was an impoverished
Argentinian boxer who quickly rose to fame and became the lineal light
middleweight World Boxing Organization (“WBO”) and WBC champion.4
1. “Participants” or “those who participate” are individuals or companies who in some
way contribute to the organization of boxing events. Such individuals include fighters,
promoters, managers, and sanctioning bodies.
2. See Michael J. Jurek, Note, Janitor or Savior: The Role of Congress in Professional
Boxing Reform, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1187, 1187 n.7 (2006) (“Years of corruption, manipulation, and
scandal have tarnished the sport to the point that it is hardly covered by the mainstream media.”).
3. MARAVILLA (Blue Production Company 2014).
4. Id.
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However, after winning the WBC belt, Sebastian Zbik was the WBC
mandatory challenger.5 HBO, a television network that pays promoters to
broadcast Martinez’s fights, preferred that Martinez fight someone more
competitive.6 During Martinez and HBO’s indecision, WBC stripped
Martinez of his belt and handed it to the mandatory challenger Zbik. 7 Zbik
was required to defend his belt against Julio César Chávez Jr., the son of a
Mexican boxing legend.8 Later, HBO agreed to air the fight between Zbik
and Chávez, despite the network’s disinclination to broadcast a fight
between Martinez and Zbik.9 After defeating Zbik, Chávez became the
WBC light middleweight champion.10 Because of the ease11 in becoming
the WBC middleweight champion, many boxing analysts have stated that
Chávez was nothing but a “paper champion” who was handed a belt due to
his name and nationality.12
Although fighters are usually the primary targets of corruption, two
recent lawsuits demonstrate that even the wealthiest and most influential
can be victims of deception. On May 5, 2015, Golden Boy Promotions
(“Golden Boy”), one of boxing’s biggest promotional companies, along
with its part owner, Bernard Hopkins, filed a complaint against another
major figure in professional boxing, Alan Haymon.13 The complaint

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. MARAVILLA, supra note 3.
10. Id.
11. The ease stems from the mismatch of the fight: Although “Zbik is actually a good
fighter . . . [he is] not good enough to be a threat and is not necessarily a dangerous opponent.”
Kirk Jackson, Impressions of Chavez vs. Zbik and Moving Forward, BOXING INSIDER,
http://www.boxinginsider.com/columns/impressions-of-chavez-vs-zbik-and-moving-forward/
[http://perma.cc/BV5F-SBH8].
12. MARAVILLA, supra note 3.
13.
Al
Haymon,
BOXREC,
http://boxrec.com/media/index.php/Al_Haymon
[http://perma.cc/ME9Y-BMLZ] (“Al Haymon is a so-called adviser, manager, and/or promoter to
many top boxers in the United States. . . . He is licensed in Nevada as a manager, yet he also
performs many of the same functions as a promoter.”).
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describes Haymon’s dominance over the financial aspect of boxing.14 It
alleges that Haymon engaged in unlawful business practices and criminal
activities that violated the Muhammad Ali Act, the Sherman Act, and other
federal and state unfair competition laws.15 On July 1, 2015, another major
promotional company, Top Rank, Inc., filed its own complaint against
Haymon and accused him of similar violations.16
The purpose of this Note is multifold: first, Part II will show that
corruption is an established facet of modern boxing, taking on different
forms throughout the decades. Further, it will show that corruption is a
problem that government efforts have failed to cure. Second, Part III of
this Note will analyze existing laws enacted by legislatures while Part IV
will analyze different proposals made by scholars that aim to curtail
corruption, such as the creation of a union or an administrative agency.
However, as will be shown, partiality towards the fighters’ interests and
overall lack of enforcement has rendered such measures mere bauble,
making them ineffective in countering corruption.
Lastly, in Part V, this Note will argue that a private governing body in
the form of a league is the best solution to combat corruptive practices. In
fact, it is uncontested in boxing literature that the most effective cure to
corruptive conduct in the sport is the establishment of a private governing
body. However, no one has addressed how such a governing body would
look, function, or combat corruption.17 This Note will propose a model of a
private league that will effectively combat corruption by attacking it from
different fronts. This means that to effectively cure boxing’s corruptive
ills, the private league will represent and protect the interests of all
participating parties. Thus, the proposed private league would provide
proper oversight of the sport because it would create new rules and laws
that address emerging issues and help protect and address the interests of
all participants. Moreover, not only would the league provide proper
protection for all parties, it would also be self-enforcing because
14. See Complaint at *12–17, Golden Boy Promotions LLC v. Alan Haymon, No. 2:15cv-03378, 2015 WL 2089683 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2015).
15. Id.
16. Complaint at *2, Top Rank, Inc. v. Alan Haymon, No. 2:15-cv-04961, 2015 WL
4073114 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2015).
17. This author is not aware of, nor did extensive research for this Note to show, any
jurisprudence articulating how a private governing body would operate to curtail corruption in
boxing.
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participants would be incentivized to police themselves in exchange for
protection.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: BOXING, CORRUPTION, AND REGULATION
A. The Beginning
Corruption is all but a novel issue in the sport of boxing. Since the
time when prizefights in the United States were held in the backrooms of
taverns, abusive and corruptive practices have penetrated the sport.18
During the early twentieth century, boxing became extremely popular in
the United States.19 After many attempts to legitimize boxing, New York
enacted the Frawley Law in 1911, making it the first state to recognize
boxing as a legitimate sport.20 Along with legitimization came regulation:
the Frawley Law created the first state athletic commission.21 Part of the
law required a “no-decision” declaration for matches that did not end in a
knockout.22 This requirement was an effort to regulate judges and thereby
minimize corruption in boxing outcomes.23 But like the many other
regulatory efforts this Note will discuss, the Frawley Law was ineffective
as corruption took new forms. Corruptive practices shifted to news
reporters: reporters began to declare unofficial outcomes of fights (known
as newspaper decisions) and people who gambled on the outcomes of such
fights would agree to bind themselves to decisions of specific reporters.24
It was not until the 1950s that the federal government first intervened
in professional boxing.25 During the 1940s and 1950s, organized crime
held substantial power in the sport.26 After the Department of Justice
18. See ROBERT G. RODRIGUEZ, THE REGULATION OF BOXING: A HISTORY AND
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLICIES AMONG AMERICAN STATES 25–26 (2009).
19. CONGRESS AND BOXING: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1960–2003 2 (Edmund P.
Edmonds & William H. Manz eds., 2005) [hereinafter CONGRESS AND BOXING].
20. GRAHAM BROOKS ET AL., FRAUD, CORRUPTION AND SPORT 161–62 (2013).
21. See RODRIGUEZ, supra note 18, at 33.
22. Id. at 34.
23. See id. at 33–34.
24. See id. at 34.
25. BROOKS ET AL., supra note 20, at 163.
26. CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19.
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(“DOJ”) launched an investigation into organized crime in boxing, it filed a
civil antitrust action against the International Boxing Club of New York,
among others,27 claiming violations of sections one and two of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.28 The district court found for the DOJ, applying the Sherman
Act to the sport of boxing. The defendants appealed directly to the
Supreme Court of the United States.29
Before the Supreme Court, the government alleged that the
defendants engaged in interstate trade and commerce when promoting
professional championship boxing contests.30 The government further
alleged that the defendants restrained and monopolized “the promotion,
exhibition, broadcasting, telecasting, and motion picture production and
distribution of professional championship boxing contests in the United
States.”31 The Court found that professional boxing was subject to antitrust
laws and, unlike baseball, did not enjoy antitrust exemptions.32 The Court
held that the government was entitled to pursue its cause of action and
affirmed the district court’s decision.33
In the following decades, this Supreme Court decision encouraged
Congress to monitor boxing more closely.34 Beginning in 1960, Senator
Estes Kefauver, Chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and
27. See United States v. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 242 (1955) (stating
that the other corporations and individuals named as defendants included the Madison Square
Garden Corporation, James D. Norris, and Arthur M. Wirtz).
28. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S. at 237–38 n.2; BROOKS ET AL., supra note 20, at
163; CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19.
29. See generally Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S. 236.
30. Id. at 238–39 (stating that such interstate trade and commerce included (1) negotiating
contracts with boxers, advertising agencies, referees, judges, announcers, and other personnel
living in states other than those in which the promoter resides; (2) leasing suitable arenas; (3)
selling tickets; and (4) arranging other details for boxing contests outside the states in which the
promoters resided).
31. Id. at 239–40 (stating that the claim regarding the monopolization of boxing’s trade
and commerce is based on the conspiracy to exclude competition). It is claimed that such
conspiracy began in 1949 with an agreement between the defendant and Joe Louis which, for an
attractive amount, required Louis to resign his title and exclusive rights to four promising fighters
he managed. Additionally, the agreement required Louis to assign exclusive rights to broadcast,
televise, and film the contests of these fighters to the defendants. Id.
32. Id. at 241–45.
33. Id.; Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 252 (1959).
34. CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19.
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Monopoly, commenced a four-year investigation of the sport.35 During a
hearing in 1961, former heavyweight champion Gene Tunney testified that
“there is a great tendency for monopoly to develop in the sport, . . . [It] is
strong, influential, and almost unbreakable.”36
Essentially, Senator
Kefauver concluded that organized crime did, in fact, control the sport.37
B. The 1960s: The Decade of Failed Attempts
The 1960s was a decade permeated with fervent attempts by Congress
to overhaul professional boxing. Before his death, Senator Kefauver
attempted to pass bills that created a Federal Boxing Commission (S. 1474
and 1182).38 In 1965, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
held multiple hearings regarding six bills that were introduced to the House
which dealt with the creation of such a commission.39 Senator Kefauver’s
bills and those that came after enjoyed great support from former boxing
champions, boxers, sports commissioners, and politicians, among others.40
Supporters of these bills felt strongly that a federal regulatory commission
was needed to rescue this great sport from deterioration.41 Unsurprisingly,
Congress refused to pass any of these bills and instead, largely ignored
boxing for the next twelve years.42

35. Id. at 3.
36. Professional Boxing Part I: Jacob “Jake” LaMotta: Hearings on S. Res. 238 Before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 1418 (1960)
(statement of Gene Tunney, former American professional boxer).
37. See CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19, at 8.
38. Id. at 4–9.
39. Id. at 10–11.
40. Professional Boxing Part 3: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 1267 (1961) (testimony of Rocky Marciano); id. at
1346 (testimony of Melvin Krulewitch); id. at 1405 (testimony of Jack Dempsey); Professional
Boxing Part 4: Liston-Clay Fight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1761 (1964).
41. Professional Boxing Part 3, supra note 40 (testimony of Rocky Marciano); id. at 1346
(testimony of Melvin Krulewitch); id. at 1405 (testimony of Jack Dempsey); Professional Boxing
Part 4, supra note 40, at 1766.
42. CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19, at 12.
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C. The 1970s, Don King, and Failure
In 1977, the American Broadcasting Company (“ABC”) television
network joined Don King Productions and created a tournament called the
United States Boxing Championships.43 Shortly after the formation of this
tournament, a scandal surfaced that focused national attention on the world
of boxing: many fighters in the sanctioned fights of the United States
Boxing Championships had fabricated records.44 Consequently, twelve
years after the last congressional attempt to federally regulate boxing, a
House subcommittee held hearings to consider an investigation of the
United States Boxing Championships.45 Despite the subcommittee’s
concerns regarding Don King’s questionable business practices and his
relationship with fighters whose bouts were televised on ABC, Congress
showed no interest and once more failed to produce a legislative response.46
Threatened by the return of organized crime into boxing, yet another
bill was proposed two years later.47 This time, the bill was proposed by the
House Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the House Committee on
Education and the Workforce.48 Although a hearing was held in 1979, the
bill never made it out alive.49 During the 1980s and until 1993, different
House subcommittees proposed many bills but each suffered the fate of
their unfortunate predecessors.50
D. The Turn of the Century: Congress Finally Legislates
In 1994, Senators John McCain and Richard Bryan sponsored the
Professional Boxing Safety Act (“PBSA”), which focused on protecting the

43. BROOKS ET AL., supra note 20, at 165.
44. Id. (stating as an example Ike Fluellen, who was given an honorable mention as the
“most improved boxer” and claimed two wins in Mexico when, in reality, he had not fought at all
that year).
45. CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19, at 12.
46. BROOKS ET AL., supra note 20, at 165.
47. CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19, at 12–13.
48. Id.
49. BROOKS ET AL., supra note 20, at 166.
50. Id. at 166–67; CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19, at 13–15.
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health and safety of boxers.51 Instead, the House received a bill titled the
Boxing Labor Standards Act, which the 103rd Congress did not pass.52 In
1995, McCain reintroduced the PBSA while proposing the Boxing, Safety,
Retirement, and Restraining Act of 1995.53 After almost four decades of
congressional inaction, the 104th Congress enacted the PBSA.54
The purpose of the PBSA is: “(1) to improve and expand the system
of safety precautions that protects the welfare of professional boxers; and
(2) to assist State boxing commissions to provide proper oversight for the
professional boxing industry in the United States.”55 To protect boxers’
health, the PBSA requires that a physician and an ambulance or medical
personnel be present during fights56 and that boxers undergo physical
examinations before every fight in order to prevent injured boxers from
fighting.57 Unfortunately, loopholes in the PBSA were evident the same
year of its enactment: these requirements did nothing to protect boxers
from injury, mainly because the Act depended on fractured enforcement at
the state-level.58 Although the passage of the PBSA was the first major
legislation in professional boxing—hence, a significant moment in the
sport’s history—the PBSA came under great criticism because of its lack of
enforceability and inability to remedy industry corruption.59 Thus, the
PBSA’s ineffectiveness further diminished the sport’s credibility.60
51. CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19, at 15–16; Professional Boxing Safety Act, 15
U.S.C. § 6302 (1996).
52. CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19, at 16.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Professional Boxing Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6302 (1996).
56. Id. § 6304.
57. Id.
58. Antoinette Vacca, Boxing: Why It Should Be Down for the Count, 13 SPORTS LAW. J.
207, 214 (2006).
59. See Melissa Bell, Time to Give Boxers a Fighting Chance: The Muhammad Ali
Boxing Reform Act, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 473, 477–78 (2000). While the 1996 Act
forbid commissioners from creating deals with promoters, nothing in the act addressed the
problem of state boxing commission members who served on organizations that state boxing
commissions regulated. Additionally, the 1996 Act did not address staged fights in bouts where
promoters who were interested in a particular result were the parties paying the referees. Id.
60. Id. at 478.
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Senator McCain’s persistence did not stop there. In 1998, he
introduced, along with two other bills, the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform
Act (“Ali Act”), which created amendments to the PBSA.61 The Ali Act
sought to address some of the PBSA’s shortcomings.62 While the PBSA’s
central purpose was to protect boxers within the ring,63 the Ali Act aimed to
protect the rights and welfare of professional boxers by mitigating
exploitative, oppressive, and unethical business practices outside the ring.64
More specifically, the Ali Act addressed corruption in the boxing
industry by remedying contractual abuses65 and conflicts of interest
between promoters, managers, and fighters.66 Further, the Ali Act sought
to reduce fixed fights through the regulation of judges, referees,67 and
sanctioning organizations.68
Despite being a laudable legislative
accomplishment, the Ali Act proved to be another “failure to launch”
effort.

61. The two other bills were the Professional Boxing Safety Act Amendments of 1999,
which was introduced in the Senate, and the Professional Boxing Integrity Act, which was
introduced in the House. However, both of these bills died in Congress while the Ali Act enjoyed
reports from both Houses of Congress recommending its passage. CONGRESS AND BOXING,
supra note 19, at 17–18. Technically, the Ali Act was reintroduced in 1999 since it was first
introduced, but not considered, in 1998. See id. at 18.
62. BROOKS ET AL., supra note 20, at 167.
63. Brad Ehrlichman, In This Corner: An Analysis of Federal Boxing Legislation, 34
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 421, 421 (2011) (quoting the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15
U.S.C. § 6301 (2006)).
64. Id. (quoting the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006)); 145
Cong. Rec. 28884, 28886 (1999) (stating that the purpose of the Ali Act is “(1) to protect the
rights and welfare of professional boxers on an interstate basis by preventing certain exploitive
oppressive and unethical business practices; (2) to assist State boxing commissions in their efforts
to provide more effective public oversight of the sport; and (3) to promote honorable competition
in professional boxing and enhance the overall integrity of the industry”).
65. Professional Boxing Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6307(a) (2015) (allowing the American
Boxing Commission to create contractual guidelines regarding boxing contracts that state
commissions must follow); id. § 6307(b) (affording protections from coercive contracts).
66. Id. § 6307(e).
67. Id. § 6307(f) (forbidding judges and referees from receiving compensation, directly or
indirectly, in connection with a boxing match until they provide the state commission that is
regulating such match with a statement of all considerations having to do with said match); id. §
6307(h) (requiring professional boxing matches to have referees and judges who are certified and
approved by state commissions).
68. Id. § 6307(c)–(d).
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III. THE LAW: DISILLUSIONS NOT SOLUTIONS IN THE MUHAMMAD ALI
BOXING REFORM ACT AND ANTITRUST LAWS
This section will introduce current boxing laws and assess their
enforcement and effectiveness.
A. The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act
The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act (“Ali Act”) suffers from
many defects, one of which is that its provisions do not protect boxers as
much as they provide consequences for promoters.69 Moreover, the Ali Act
provides minimal financial protection for boxers and ultimately protects top
contenders more than fighters who need it.70 While the Ali Act does a
great job in remedying some of boxing’s major problems, a major defect is
that it lacks proper and realistic enforcement.71 Because the Ali Act does
not establish a proper system of oversight, enforcement of the Act is
essentially reserved to the United States Attorney General, individual state
attorneys, and boxers.72 However, the Attorney General, the Federal Trade
Commission (the “FTC”), and the chief law enforcement officer of each
respective State are not obligated to prosecute claims regarding violations
of the Ali Act.73 Consequently, the Ali Act provides these offices and
officers with immunity from prosecution and immunity from discharging
their official duty.74
From 1996 to 2002, the Attorney General brought no cases under
federal boxing law and law enforcement agencies made no records of
referrals.75 From this five-year period of silence, it can be inferred that the
69. For further reading regarding the defects within specific provisions of the Muhammad
Ali Act see Cristina E. Groschel, Note, Down for the Count: The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform
Act and Its Shortcomings, 26 NOVA L. REV. 927, 942–50 (2002).
70. See id. at 950.
71. Devin J. Burstein, The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act: Its Problems and
Remedies, Including the Possibility of a United States Boxing Administration, 21 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 433, 459 (2003).
72. See id. at 461; Professional Boxing Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6309 (2015).
73. See Groschel, supra note 69, at 949–50.
74. Id. at 949.
75. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-699, COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI. AND
TRANSP., PROFESSIONAL BOXING ISSUES RELATED TO THE PROTECTION OF BOXERS' HEALTH,
SAFETY, AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS 5 (2003); John McCain & Ken Nahigian, A Fighting Chance
for Professional Boxing, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 7, 23 (2004).
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DOJ did not and continues not to have a demonstrated interest in
prosecuting any violations of the Ali Act or other federal boxing laws.
Further, the DOJ has explicitly stated that violations of such laws are
misdemeanors that “do not receive significant resources from the DOJ.”76
Moreover, even if the DOJ did have an interest in boxing, the Attorney
General is not in the position to oversee the sport and find violations of the
Ali Act.77 Thus, enforcement is essentially left to the state commissions
and individual boxers.78
The next option for enforcement is private civil claims brought by the
injured party.79 It is unrealistic to expect an individual boxer to sue the
sanctioning bodies or his respective promoters for violating the Ali Act.80
For a boxer to bring a cause of action under the Ali Act (or any other law
that grants him rights or protection), the boxer must know the law exists.81
The majority of boxers are uneducated and come from sheltered
backgrounds; thus, many boxers lack awareness of their legal rights and are
unlikely to exercise them.82
Assuming that a boxer is aware of his legal rights and decides to sue
his exploiter, he does so at his own peril.83 Boxers have to worry about
being blacklisted by promoters or the sanctioning bodies they are suing.84
Moreover, a boxer must figure out financially how to bring a legal action.85
Promoters are usually boxers’ only financial source and as such, boxers are
unable to bring a lawsuit without their promoters financing it.86
76. McCain, supra note 75, at 23.
77. Burstein, supra note 71, at 461.
78. Id.
79. Id. (exploring the idea of civil suits).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.; Jeremy Camacho, I Could Have Been a Contender: Arbitration and the Ali Act,
20 SPORTS LAW. J. 135, 154 (2013).
83. See Burstein, supra note 71, at 461–62 (discussing issues boxers face if they pursue a
lawsuit, including the possibility of blacklisting).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 462.
86. Id.
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Realistically, “[i]t is unlikely that a promoter will hire a lawyer so that a
fighter can sue him.”87 Therefore, only wealthy premier boxers who have
the resources to bring a claim are financially capable of actually doing so,
yet they are not the ones in need of such protection.88
The average fighter’s only realistic recourse is to turn to the state.89
However, just like the United States Attorney General, the state is not in
the position to bring claims under boxing laws.90 If a boxer with enough
knowledge of the law identifies violations of the Ali Act to the state
commission, the commission may notify the state attorney general to
prosecute the claim.91 However, the state attorney general and the state
commission would likely be unable to enforce the Ali Act without support
from the federal government because the states that do have commissions
are usually understaffed and underfunded.92
Moreover, as noted
previously, the state attorneys’ general and commissions’ records indicate
an overall lack of interest.93
In short, although the Ali Act aims to solve many of boxing’s major
problems, it fails to reform the sport because of its lack of enforcement.94
B. Antitrust Laws
For those harmed by corruptive practices, antitrust laws, such as the
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and state antitrust laws, provide other
avenues of relief. Section one of the Sherman Act provides: “Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in

87. Id.
88. See id.
89. Burstein, supra note 71, at 462.
90. See id. at 461–62.
91. Id. at 462.
92. See id. (stating that some critics have gone much further, arguing that state boxing
commissions are “jokes, run by small-time politicians interested in free seats facing TV
cameras”).
93. Hearing on Reform of the Professional Boxing Industry Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Sci, and Transp., 107th Cong. 8 (2001) (statement of Gregory P. Sirb) (“The current
system of letting the various State Attorney Generals [sic] handle these issues has not been
working.”).
94. See Burstein, supra note 71, at 463.
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restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal.”95 Section two of the Sherman Act
essentially outlaws monopolization, attempts to monopolize, or
conspiracies to monopolize.96 A party that violates either of these two
sections is guilty of a felony.97 Moreover, section 15 of the Clayton Act
grants the federal courts jurisdiction to “prevent and restrain violations of
this Act.”98 The Clayton Act allows the attorney general of the DOJ or
private parties threatened with loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws to seek an injunction.99
A plaintiff may bring a private cause of action against a party who
violated an antitrust law provision and caused the plaintiff’s antitrust
injury.100 Accordingly, a harmed boxer or even a promoter may bring such
an action. The DOJ is the exclusive federal authority that can enforce the
Sherman Act and the DOJ shares federal authority with the FTC and other
agencies to enforce the Clayton Act.101 Additionally, state attorneys
general hold significant rights under federal and state antitrust laws to make
enforcement decisions. State enforcers may bring state law claims as
supplemental claims in federal law and may make enforcement decisions
that differ from other state and federal enforcers.102
However, as noted, most boxers do not have the legal knowledge to
identify when unlawful conduct has caused them injury and generally do
not have the means to finance litigation. Moreover, the DOJ has shown

95. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2016).
96. Sherman Antitrust Act § 2; DOUGLAS BRODER, U.S. ANTITRUST LAW AND
ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICE INTRODUCTION 18 (2d ed. 2012).
97. BRODER, supra note 96.
98. Id. at 22 (citing The Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (2016)).
99. Id.
100. SPORTS AND ANTITRUST LAW 87–88 (2014) (“All private antitrust plaintiffs must
have antitrust standing. Antitrust standing is generally determined by reference to five factors:
(1) whether the plaintiff’s injury is an antitrust injury; (2) the directness of the injury; (3) the
speculative measure of the harm; (4) the risk of duplicative recovery; and (5) the complexity in
the apportioning damages. . . . Antitrust injury is an injury to a plaintiff’s business or property
that is of the type the antitrust laws were meant to prevent and that flows from that which makes
the challenged conduct unlawful.”).
101. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 707 (Jonathan I. Gleklen et al. eds., 7th ed. 2014).
102. Id. at 740–41.
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little interest in investigating the sport.103 Antitrust laws exist and can be
enforced but, like the Ali Act, there is no one to enforce them.
IV. OTHER PROPOSALS: IDEALISTICALLY AROUSING, PRACTICALLY
IMPOSSIBLE
A privatized national league headed by a Commissioner and national
governing body is not the only proposed solution to the corruptive ills of
professional boxing. Other solutions include unionization of boxers, more
federal regulation, or a federally governed commission. Aside from the
creation of a privatized national league, the remaining proposed solutions
are impractical and fail to address other forms of corruption present in
professional boxing besides those affecting boxers’ interests.
A. Unionization: A One-Sided Solution
Looking to become champion and net over one million dollars,
professional boxer Gerald McClellan fought WBC super middleweight
champion Nigel Benn on February 23, 1995.104 McClellan was knocked
out in the tenth round and left unconscious when returned to his corner.105
After losing the fight, McClellan was rushed to the hospital where he
underwent surgery to save his life.106 As a result of his injuries, McClellan
suffered multiple strokes and became deaf and blind.107 To pay for his
medical expenses, McClellan exhausted his assets and became dependent
on trust fund donations.108
Although the fight had caused McClellan’s physical injures, it was the
lack of a sport-wide pension or disability insurance fund to cover medical
costs that ruined McClellan financially.109 While some professional boxers
103. This author has not come across any investigation of boxing by the FTC or other
federal government agency that has granted authority under the Clayton Act to pursue civil
action.
104. Arlin R. Crisco, Note, Fighting Outside the Ring: A Labor Alternative to the
Continued Federal Regulation of Professional Boxing, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1139 (1999).
105. Id. at 1140.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1139.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1140.
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make millions during their boxing career, many other “journeymen”
boxers110 (who either suffer physical tragedies similar to McClellan or
retire with some chronic ailment because of the sport) are left to fight high
medical costs with no financial security.111 Indeed, journeyman boxers
take many risks that subject them to financial ruin and abuse: oftentimes,
these fighters have no assistance in negotiating contractual terms with
promoters and managers.112 Further, federal regulations fail to adequately
address conditions inside the ring and fail to regulate unscrupulous
promoters and managers.113 Additionally, the lack of uniformity among
state laws addressing these problems has left fighters with unreliable
protection.114
The issues above particularly concern proponents of unionization in
professional boxing. Such proponents argue that a union in professional
boxing would benefit its members by ensuring that the balance of power
shifts from promoters and sanctioning bodies to boxers.115 Unionized
boxers would have the power to organize federally protected work
stoppages, thereby halting the income of the sport’s, promoters, and
managers until better benefits and working conditions are established.116
Through the force of collective bargaining, like what is used in professional
team sports, boxers would be able to bargain for a pension or retirement
plan, gain more leverage in choosing bouts, improve working conditions,
and reduce financial exploitation.117

110. “Journeymen” boxers are those that jump “from promoter to promoter, or manager
to manager, hoping to get placed as opponents in fights” while making very little money. They
are willing to “fight all the time, anywhere, in order to make enough money to get by.” See
Health and Safety of Professional Boxing: Hearings Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and
Transp., 103d Cong. 70 (1994).
111. Crisco, supra note 104, at 1140–41.
112. Id. at 1141.
113. See id. at 1153–56.
114. See id. at 1153–55.
115. Id. at 1175; Devin J. Burstein, The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act: Its Problems
and Remedies, Including the Possibility of a United States Boxing Administration, 21 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 433, 494 (2003).
116. Crisco, supra note 104, at 1175.
117. See id. at 1164–65.
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However, the benefits of unionizing boxers are one-sided: although it
appears that unionization might give a collective voice to many fighters, a
union would not address issues and interests that do not concern the fighter.
Unlike the legislative attempts that sought to mitigate abusive and
corruptive business practices in general and not just practices against
fighters, a professional boxers union would represent and promote only the
boxers’ interests.118 Moreover, unionization could be detrimental to the
sport’s top earners: if the majority of professional boxers (the majority
being comprised of journeymen fighters) vote to be represented by a union,
boxers would lose their right to bargain individually.119 Top-prize fighters
could be limited by a ceiling on purses if, during collective bargaining,
earning caps are offered in exchange for benefits.120 Thus, unionization is
an inadequate solution to effectively mitigate the corruptive ills of
professional boxing because it would only relieve the journeymen boxers
from unfair and abusive practices while leaving the interests of the
promoters, managers, and other boxers unprotected.
Even if unionization protected all parties, the creation of a collective
labor union among professional boxers is practically impossible. First,
boxers have been unable to establish a union because of the sport’s current
system.121 The boxers who benefit the most and are truly in need of a labor
union are boxing’s underclass.122 However, these journeymen boxers are
not in the position to establish a union as they lack the ability and power to

118. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2016) (“The term ‘labor
organization’ means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or
in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work.”).
119. Brad Ehrlichman, In This Corner: An Analysis of Federal Boxing Legislation, 34
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 421, 450 (2011) (“[I]n sports leagues, unionized players generally engage in
individual bargaining with teams . . . . ‘[O]nce an exclusive representative has been selected, the
individual employee is forbidden by federal law from negotiating directly with the employer
absent the representative’s consent, even though that employee may actually receive less
compensation under the collective bargain than he or she would through individual
negotiations.’” (quoting Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass’n, 66 F.3d 523, 528 (2d Cir. 1995))).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 449; see Kathy Glasgow, The Fight of Their Lives, MIAMI NEW TIMES (July
20,
2000),
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/the-fight-of-their-lives-6355675
[http://perma.cc/AA39-HNG3] (stating that in 2000, the Boxer’s Organizing Committee (“BOC”)
had been attempting to organize boxers for about thirteen years).
122. Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 449.
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do so.123 Notwithstanding the difficulty of organizing thousands of fighters
across the country, boxers typically work nine-to-five jobs and have little
time to organize.124 Moreover, because many journeymen boxers have
humble backgrounds and are vulnerable to promoters, promoters are often
able to recognize desperate boxers who are willing to fight for a handsome
wad of cash.125 Further, if a union were to exist, promoters might begin to
contract non-union fighters to hinder collective organization.126 Fighters
who decide not to organize with the majority but instead concede to
promoters’ attractive offers and opportunities would not enjoy the benefits
and protections that collective bargaining provides.127 In effect, boxers
would remain unprotected from unfair treatment inside and outside the
ring.
Even if unionization protected all parties and even assuming that a
union was a practical and effective centralized authority, it is still unclear
whether professional boxers are permitted to unionize under the law. The
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) provides: “[e]mployees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.”128 As defined in the Act, the term
“employee” excludes “independent contractors.”129
To determine whether a worker is an employee, the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB”)130 and other courts apply broad common law

123. Id.
124. See id. at 450.
125. Id. at 449.
126. Id. at 494.
127. Id.
128. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2015).
129. Id. § 152(3) (“The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee, and shall not be
limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states
otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has
not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include . . .
any individual having the status of an independent contractor . . . .”).
130. The NLRB is a board created by the NLRA that consists of five members appointed
by the President of the United States. The NLRB has the authority to delegate to its regional
directors its power to “determine the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining, to
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agency principles.131 As the Supreme Court explained, there is “no
shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer,
but all the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with
no one factor being decisive.”132 Both the NLRB and reviewing courts
have refused to construct a specific formula to differentiate between an
employee and an independent contractor.133 Accordingly, “[r]eviewing
courts have applied a variety of case-specific factors similar to those listed
in the Restatement (Second) of Agency.”134
On the one hand, it is argued that professional boxers fall under the
NLRA’s definition of an employee because promoters control the most
critical economic elements of fighters’ careers, and fighters perform
functions essential to the promoter’s operation.135 One of the agency
factors that courts give much weight to is the “right to control.”136
Although promoters do not have control over the daily training of fighters,
promoters do have the power through their exclusive representation
contracts to limit a boxer’s ability to fight.137 Promoters do so by choosing
the boxer’s opponents, negotiating the time and place of the bout, and even
investigate and provide for hearings, and determine whether a question of representation exists . .
. .” Id. § 153.
131. NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968).
132. Id.
133. Herald Co. v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 430, 433 (2d Cir. 1971).
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) (providing that “(a) the
extent of the control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the
work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the
kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the
direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill required in the
particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities,
tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the
person is employed; (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or
not the work is part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe
they are creating the relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in
business”); Crisco, supra note 104, at 1169–70.
135. Crisco, supra note 104, at 1172.
136. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Boston, Inc. v. NLRB, 506 F.2d 596, 597–98 (1974) (“The
right to control the manner of physical performance of the services—as opposed to control over
the results sought—is generally determinative of employee status, although a number of matters
of fact must be considered in making that determination.”); Crisco, supra note 104, at 1173.
137. Crisco, supra note 104, at 1171–72.
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requiring the boxer to give up his title if the promoter decides not to
promote a bout against the mandatory challenger.138
An additional factor that distinguishes an employee from an
independent contractor is that employees “do not operate their own
independent business, but perform functions that are essential parts of the
company’s normal operations.”139 Despite promotional contracts explicitly
referring to fighters as independent contractors,140 professional boxers are
an “essential part” of a promoter’s operations because without the fighter,
there is no fight to promote.141 If these factors and circumstances are taken
together, it seems a professional boxer would fall under the NLRA’s
definition of employee.142 Nevertheless, even if the NLRB and other courts
recognize professional boxers as employees as defined under the NLRA,
boxers’ lack of labor law remedies makes the NLRB an inadequate
recourse for their legal problems.143
On the other hand, one may argue that professional boxers are
independent contractors and do not fall under the NLRA’s definition of
employee.144 In FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, the court determined that
package delivery providers’ single-route drivers were independent
contractors under the NLRA because FedEx could not “prescribe hours of
work, whether or when the contractors take breaks, what routes they
follow, or other details of performance.”145 Promoters, like FedEx, do not
have such detailed oversight over fighters: promoters do not structure
fighters’ training, they do not reprimand or discipline fighters, fighters
choose their own trainers, and fighters are not required to show up to the
gym every day for work.146
138. Id. at 1173.
139. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. at 259.
140. Herald Co., 444 F.2d at 431 (determining that newspaper distributors were
employees despite being explicitly referred to as independent contractors on contracts).
141. Crisco, supra note 104, at 1174.
142. Id. at 1167–75.
143. See Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 452.
144. Id. at 451.
145. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 493, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
146. See Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 451.
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A comparable sport to professional boxing is professional golfing
since both are considered sports with individual athletes. When compared
to the argument that boxers are employees of their promoters, professional
golfers have a stronger argument147 that they are employees of the PGA
Tour.148 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court determined that professional
golfers were not employees, but independent contractors.149
B. Federal Regulatory Agency: The United States Boxing Administration
Although the PBSA and the Ali Act were foundational pieces of
legislative reform, they were not designed to cure all existing problems150
and the issues that they were designed to remedy were not effectively
addressed. Therefore, Senator John McCain, sponsor of the PBSA and Ali
Act, introduced the Professional Boxing Amendments Act (“PBAA”) to
address the shortcomings and oversights of both the PBSA and the Ali
Act.151 The PBAA’s central purpose is to create the United States Boxing
Administration (“USBA”),152 a federal regulatory agency which would
oversee the sport. Senator McCain stated:
The primary functions of the USBA would be to protect the
health, safety, and general interests of boxers.
More
specifically, the USBA would, among other things: administer
Federal boxing laws and coordinate with other Federal
regulatory agencies to ensure that these laws are enforced;
oversee all professional boxing matches in the United States;
and work with the boxing industry and local commissions to
improve the status and standards of the sport.153
147. Id. at 451–52.
148. PGA stands for Professional Golfers’ Association. The PGA Tour is the privatized
league for professional golfing that organizes the main golfing tours in North America. See
generally PGA of America vs. PGA Tour, PGA S. CENT. SECTION ARK. CHAPTER,
http://arkansaspga.com/2011/09/14/pga-of-america-vs-pga-tour/ [http://perma.cc/9PSX-8CRW].
149. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 697 n.2 (2001).
150. John McCain & Ken Nahigian, A Fighting Chance for Professional Boxing, 15
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 7, 33 (2004).
151. Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 444.
152. Also known as the United States Boxing Commission (“USBC”).
153. 148 CONG. REC. S5032-02 (daily ed. June 5, 2002) (statement of Sen. McCain).
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The USBA would belong to the Department of Labor and be headed
by an administrator experienced in boxing and the President, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, would appoint him or her.154 One of the
responsibilities of the USBA would be to administer federal boxing laws
and work with other federal regulatory agencies to oversee boxing matches
in the United States, enforce the law, and help improve the status and
standards of boxing.155 Under section 203(b)(5), an important purpose of
the USBA is to ensure, through the Attorney General, the FTC, and other
appropriate officers and agencies of the federal government, “that Federal
and State laws applicable to professional boxing matches in the United
States are vigorously, effectively, and fairly enforced.”156
In essence, the USBA would be able to enforce and strengthen current
federal laws, discipline violators, and create new regulations protecting the
interests of boxers. Further, the USBA would have authority to launch and
conduct investigations regarding legal violations and, if needed, seek
injunctive relief in court.157 The USBA would create an additional avenue
for injured boxers to address the harm they have suffered while avoiding
costly and time-consuming litigation.158 Under the PBAA, boxers would
be granted administrative hearings in which the USBA would conduct
discovery and prosecute claims.159 The USBA would have the authority to
license boxers, promoters, managers, sanctioning organizations, and
broadcasters, as well as suspend or revoke such licenses if the USBA finds
violations of federal boxing laws or if it believes that revocations or
suspensions serve the public interest.160 Moreover, the USBA would
maintain a centralized database of medical and statistical information on
boxers in the United States that would be used confidentially by local
commissions responsible for licensing decisions.161 The fees charged
154. Burstein, supra note 115, at 467; McCain, supra note 150, at 30.
155. McCain, supra note 150, at 30.
156. Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2002, S. 2550, 107th Cong. § 203(b)(5)
(2002).
157. Id. § 207(b)(1)(A).
158. Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 445.
159. Id.
160. McCain, supra note 150, at 30–31.
161. Id. at 31.
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would be used to offset a certain percentage of the expenses associated
with activities of the agency.162
The Act is by no means flawless and has some troublesome
requirements. The PBAA requires that certain contract provisions
developed by the USBA be included in every contract with a boxer.163 It
also requires each state boxing commission to review each of these
contracts to ensure that they comply with the law.164 As one legal scholar
critiqued, mandatory contract provisions are paternalistic and limit boxers’
and promoters’ freedom to contract because a boxer might have to accept a
contract that does not include certain mandatory provisions in order to get
his “shot” in the ring.165 While mandatory contract provisions serve to
protect the boxer’s health, such requirements both limit a boxer’s financial
opportunities and expose promoters to more risks and costs.
For a person to arrange, promote, organize, produce, or fight in a
match, the PBAA requires that the match be approved by the USBA.166
This provision initially appears to provide extra protection for all fighters
by having the agency review and approve each match.167 However, a
match is presumed to be approved by USBA absent one of four
exceptions.168 One exception requires actual approval when matches
involve boxers who have “suffered 10 consecutive defeats in professional
boxing matches; or ha[ve] been knocked out 5 consecutive times in
professional boxing matches.”169 This means that only matches that
include the lowest of the blue-collar boxers would be individually reviewed
and approved under this exception.170 Another exception applies to
162. Id.
163. Professional Boxing Amendments Act, S. 84, 110th Cong. § 10(a) (2007).
164. Id.
165. Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 447–48 (“An unheralded boxer might have to accept
contract terms falling below the federally mandated floor in order to even get his ‘shot’ in the
ring. Otherwise, a promoter might decide that signing an unproven prospect is too expensive or
too risky.”).
166. Professional Boxing Amendments Act § 5(a).
167. Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 446.
168. Id. (citing Professional Boxing Amendments Act § 5(a)).
169. Professional Boxing Amendments Act § 5(a).
170. Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 446.
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matches that are “advertised to the public as championship match[es],” or
matches that involve ten rounds or more,171 which, in practice, would apply
only to top contenders and premier boxers.172 Thus, it has been pointed out
that under the USBA approval mandate, only the lowest of blue-collar
fighters and top contenders are protected, leaving the majority of the boxers
who fall in between unprotected.173 Consequently, protection of boxers
through the approval of matches by the USBA is, at most, an empty
promise.
Additionally, Senator McCain acknowledged that the USBA would
not interfere with the daily operations of local boxing and that the agency
would have to consult with local commissions.174 Senator McCain further
stated that the administrator would only exercise his power if there was
reasonable grounds for intervention.175 Accordingly, two government
agencies would have to agree and work together in order to pass a single
regulatory measure. One could only imagine such glorious bureaucratic
efficiency!
Further, the USBA might fall victim to its overreaching power. If the
USBA is part of the Department of Labor or is its own administrative
agency itself, the USBA would be governed by administrative law.176
Congress creates administrative agencies and delegates power to such
agencies through an organic act, also known as an enabling act.177 Under
current administrative common law, the USBA would be given great
deference regarding issues of statutory authority and statutory
interpretation of its organic act.178 This great deference given to agencies
would make the USBA vulnerable to overreaching its power. The

171. Professional Boxing Amendments Act § 5(a).
172. Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 446.
173. Id.
174. McCain, supra note 150, at 31.
175. Id.
176. JACK M. BEERMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: WHAT MATTERS AND WHY 128
(2011).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 127. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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difficulty of judicial review of administrative decisions further adds to this
vulnerability.179
Further, similar to unionization in that the purpose of the USBA is to
protect only the boxer’s interests, the USBA would not adequately address
corruptive practices within boxing in general. Again, boxing is a sport but
it has developed into a lucrative business.180 If the USBA’s only authority
is to regulate boxers’ interests, doing so would be at the expense of the
business aspect of boxing181 or would otherwise leave the corrupt business
side of the sport untouched.
While Senator McCain acknowledges that the PBAA is not the best
solution, he states that it is a “realistic” one.182 Nevertheless, reality has
proved otherwise. Since 2002, the PBAA has been reintroduced to
Congress each year and each year it has failed.183 The bill consistently
receives strong opposition and many question whether the creation of such
an agency would constitute governmental waste.184 Consequently, the
probability of the PBAA’s enactment is slim to none.185
V. THE SOLUTION: A PRIVATE GOVERNING BODY
The proposed solutions discussed earlier have a common purpose: to
safeguard boxers outside the ring from abusive and unscrupulous business
practices while protecting their wellbeing inside the ring through the
creation and enforcement of health-protecting laws.186 However, such
proposals also share two common deficiencies: partiality and
ineffectiveness.187 It is not disputed that promoters and managers

179. See BEERMAN, supra note 176, at 65–144.
180. Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 450.
181. Id.
182. McCain, supra note 150, at 33.
183. Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 444.
184. Id. at 448–49.
185. Id. at 449.
186. See supra Part IV.
187. See supra Part IV.
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frequently abuse and exploit boxers.188 It is not contested that fighters are
inadequately protected inside the ring.189 What these solutions fail to
recognize is that boxing is not just a sport but also a very lucrative
business.190 The business side of boxing has made premier boxing possible
and has created multimillion dollar opportunities for boxers.191 Boxers
fight, managers protect boxers’ interests,192 promoters make the boxing
events happen,193 and sanctioning organizations bestow prestige. A
solution that only cures the ills affecting boxers is not the solution that will
“save” boxing from corruption unless advocates of such solutions miss the
days when all boxing matches took place in the backrooms of taverns and
where boxers risked their lives for miserable pay. Therefore, the solution
that will “save” the sport in all aspects—from loss of quality, creditability,
and integrity—is one that attacks corruption on all fronts. It is one that
protects the interests of all those who participate in the sport of boxing.
A solution that represents all interests will not only address corruption
from different aspects effectively, but it will also be self-enforcing. The
other solutions discussed above are not necessarily inefficient because they
fail to address certain major concerns in the sport. In fact, it can be argued
that the Ali Act does a great job in addressing some of the issues it intends
188. Brad Ehrlichman, In This Corner: An Analysis of Federal Boxing Legislation, 34
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 421, 425 (2011).
189. Those who advocate for more protection for boxers inside the ring are concerned
with the majority of boxers, who are journeymen. These journeymen boxers risk their lives for
nominal pay and do not have sufficient funds to rectify any medical problems incurred while
boxing. Additionally, journeymen boxers are the ones most likely to overlook unfavorable
contract terms because of their hope of landing a bigger fight and their inability to afford
independent legal counsel to review and negotiate contract terms. See Ehrlichman, supra note
188, at 441–42; see also Michael J. Jurek, Janitor or Savior: The Role of Congress in
Professional Boxing Reform, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1187, 1199 (2006); John McCain & Ken Nahigian,
A Fighting Chance for Professional Boxing, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 7, 8 (2004).
190. See Jurek, supra note 189.
191. See Scott Baglio, Note, The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act: The First Jab at
Establishing Credibility in Professional Boxing, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2260 (2000).
192. See Jurek, supra note 189, at 1196; Matt Gerovac, A Fan’s Guide to the Business
World of Class Boxing, BOXING INSIDER, http://www.boxinginsider.com/columns/fans-guidebusiness-world-class-boxing/ [http://perma.cc/UV5M-PRG9].
193. Boxing promoters’ only goal is to make money. It is the promoters who take the
financial risk because they invest a lot of money in making a boxing event happen by paying for
advertisements, legal fees, and licensing, among other things. Therefore, since promoters take
most of the financial risks, they receive a big portion of the boxer’s purse, any money made from
network or pay-per-view deals, and venue admissions. See Gerovac, supra note 192.
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to cure.194 But the issue of enforcement is a separate one. Any measure
whose enforceability relies on the government’s initiative will inevitably
fail because the government lacks incentive to prosecute violations of the
law within boxing.195 Those who are in the best financial position to file a
civil suit against violators are those who either do not need protection or
are the ones who create the violations.196 Therefore, even if a measure
grants rights to an injured party to recover, those rights are essentially
rendered superfluous.197 Other proposals are inadequate because they
address only issues that are pertinent to fighters.198 Moreover, such
proposals are, in a sense, impractical.199 For these reasons and many
others, a centralized governing body in the form of a private league is
undoubtedly the best solution. In a private league, all participants and
major actors will be involved—and therefore their interests represented—
and together will be incentivized to combat corruption by policing the
sport, enforcing existing law, and creating new regulations that resolve
emerging issues.
Despite critics’ hopelessness in the establishment of a private boxing
league, such a solution is the most promising solution that will help restore
the sport and cure most of its problems.200 One legal scholar argued:
“though such an organization would be the change most likely to provide
real, lasting protection for boxers, it is also the change that is least likely to
occur, unless promoters could be convinced that their financial interests
would be best served by joining the organization.”201 Given the recent
lawsuits by Golden Boy and Top Rank against manager and advisor
Haymon, it is possible that promoters can be convinced that a private
centralized governing body may best serve their interest.
194. See Devin J. Burstein, The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act: Its Problems and
Remedies, Including the Possibility of a United States Boxing Administration, 21 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 433, 459 (2003).
195. See id. at 461.
196. See supra Part III.
197. See supra Part III.
198. See generally supra Part IV.
199. See generally supra Part IV.
200. Burstein, supra note 194, at 494; see Jurek, supra note 189, at 1226. See generally
Ehrlichman, supra note 188, at 455.
201. Ehrlichman, supra note 188, at 455.
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Thus, although the possibility of such a governing body has been
highly questioned,202 this section will illustrate the feasibility of creating a
private governing body. This section will also detail the logistics behind
how such a governing body would operate.
A. A Fight Amongst Promoters
On May 5, 2015, Golden Boy and part owner Bernard Hopkins filed a
$100 million lawsuit against Alan Haymon and his companies,203 alleging
that they are attempting to monopolize professional boxing by eliminating
all competitors.204 Haymon is alleged to have violated the Ali Act, the
Sherman Act, and other fair competition state laws.205 This lawsuit seeks
not only monetary damages but also an injunction that would bar “the
defendants from acting as managers and promoters for boxers, and from
having a financial interest in the promotions of bouts featuring the boxers
the plaintiffs manage.”206
Golden Boy alleges that Haymon “blatantly” ignores the “firewall”
required by both federal and state law that prevents an individual from
acting as both manager and promoter.207 Although Haymon denies acting
like a promoter, he forbids the boxers he manages from signing with any
promotional company, effectively forcing them to work with one of his
“sham” promoters.208 Contracts for Haymon’s managerial services include
provisions that “condition [his companies’] professional services on the
boxers’ agreement not to contract with legitimate boxing promoters,”
which according to Golden Boy’s brief is a per se violation of the Sherman
202. See id.; Burstein, supra note 194, at 496.
203. Complaint at *2, 33, Golden Boy Promotions LLC v. Haymon, No. 2:15-cv-03378,
2015 WL 2089683 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2015) (naming as defendants Alan Haymon, Alan Haymon
Development, Inc., Haymon Sports, LLC, Haymon Boxing Management, Haymon Boxing LLC,
Haymon Boxing: Media Group Holdings LLC, Waddell & Reed Financial, Inc., Waddell & Reed,
Inc., Ivy Asset Strategy Fund, WRA Asset Strategy, Ivy Funds VIP Assets Strategy, Ryan
Caldwell, and Does 1 through 20, all of whom Golden Boy Promotions alleges Haymon operates
through).
204. Id. at *8.
205. Id. at *2.
206. See id.
207. Id. at *1.
208. Id. at *11.
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Act.209 Further, the complaint alleges that Haymon already possesses a
dominant share in the management market and is now using such power to
dominate the promotional market and monopolize boxing in general.210
Moreover, Haymon and his companies have not only “acted to cut off
legitimate promoters [from] . . . promoting boxers he manages, but also
from essential network television of boxing matches and from the quality
arenas necessary for the effective presentation of their bouts.”211
Similarly, Top Rank filed a complaint on July 1, 2015 against the
same parties for violating the Sherman Act, the Ali Act, and other antitrust
state laws by unlawfully acting as both manager and promoter and
engaging in anticompetitive business practices in an effort to monopolize
the sport.212 Such efforts include “tie out” agreements with boxers that
prevent such boxers from contacting other promotional companies as a
condition for receiving managerial services.213 Moreover, the complaint
alleged that Haymon fraudulently concealed his role as promoter by
employing “sham” promoters or “frontmen” who were essentially
controlled by Haymon. 214
Further, Haymon’s alleged monopolistic practices include venue
blocking, which is the practice of fraudulently reserving major locations
and venues for events and then canceling reservations after other
competitors have been forced to seek other locations.215 Because of
Haymon’s dominance in the management business, if venues refuse to
comply with Haymon’s exclusionary demands, they risk being denied
access to bouts involving top boxers in the industry.216 Moreover, the
209. Golden Boy Promotions LLC, 2015 WL 2089683, at *12.
210. Id. at *5.
211. Id. at *2.
212. Complaint at *2–3, Top Rank Inc., v. Haymon, No. CV 15-4961-JFW (MRWx),
2015 WL 9952887 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2015).
213. Id. at *15–16.
214. Id. at *16–18 (alleging that Haymon’s sham promoters do not have promotional
contracts with their boxers, a common practice among legitimate promoters. Moreover, Top
Rank alleges that Haymon has taken up promoter responsibilities, such as paying boxers’ their
purse for certain bouts. This is evidenced by the picture Julio César Chávez, Jr. posted on
Instagram, a picture which demonstrates that Haymon paid nearly $2 million of Chávez, Jr.’s
“purse” for the bout against Fonfara.).
215. Id. at *25–26.
216. Id. at *25.
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complaint alleges that the defendants have engaged in “payola” practices
that have been similarly employed by the twentieth century music
industry.217 Such practices prevent other “promoters from access to
television broadcasters through exclusive dealing, overbooking, and other
unlawful means.”218 By buying network time, Haymon is reversing the
ordinary flow of money between promoter and broadcaster.219 Typically,
promoters sell broadcast rights to television channels.220 However, by
purchasing broadcasting time, Haymon is eliminating competition because
he is paying consumers to take his product.221 Once Haymon has
eliminated competition, it will be easy for him to recoup his initial loss
through “supracompetitive pricing.”222 Thus, it is alleged that the
defendants are “rigging” the boxing industry to control every aspect of the
sport by acting as promoters, managers, ticket broker, and sponsor for
almost every professional boxer competing in the United States.223 Top
Rank claims that this is a loss for both the television broadcasters and
consumers alike.224 However, Top Rank’s complaint was dismissed based
on a failure to state damages.225 Nevertheless, Top Rank has decided to
amend its complaint.226
Had a private governing body been in place, Haymon and his people
would not have engaged in the damaging conduct that is the subject of the
two promotional companies’ complaints. In other words, the financial
interests of Golden Boy and Top Rank would have been best served by a
private governing body because each company would not have wasted
217. Id. at *3.
218. Top Rank Inc., 2015 WL 9952887, at *4.
219. Id. at *24.
220. Id.
221. Id. at *25.
222. Id. at *24.
223. Id. at *2–3.
224. Top Rank Inc., 2015 WL 9952887, at *25.
225. Don Rafael, Judge Dismisses Antitrust Claims in Bob Arum Lawsuit vs. Al Haymon,
ESPN (Oct. 23, 2015), http://espn.go.com/boxing/story/_/id/13942821/judges-dismisses-antitrustclaims-bob-arum-lawsuit-vs-al-haymon-premier-boxing-champions
[http://perma.cc/A43S6BQM].
226. Id.
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money and resources on pursuing a claim in a court
Furthermore, the two promotional companies would not have
damages caused by Haymon’s unlawful conduct since there
been a proper system of oversight and law enforcement that
prevented Haymon from acting unlawfully.

201

of record.
suffered the
would have
would have

B. A Private Centralized Governing Body
The four major sports in the United States—baseball, basketball,
football, and hockey—are respectively organized in the form of a league
that handles the day-to-day operations of the sport and provides planning,
supervision, and control over the enterprise.227 Among other things, these
leagues operate as centralized governing bodies that provide unified rules
applicable to any participant of the sport and in the process, monitor the
welfare of players, franchises, and public confidence in the sport.228
Moreover, these organizations enforce their rules and regulations by
imposing penalties such as fines, bans, and suspensions.229 Noncompliance
with imposed penalties will prevent the person from participating in the
sport.230
A private league is the most effective solution to combat many forms
of corruption as exemplified by major professional team sports leagues,
such as the National Football League (“NFL”). Unlike boxing, the NFL is
a team sports league, but like boxing, football was tainted by deceptive
practices.231 In 1920, fourteen football team owners made a deal to save
professional football by creating a professional football league.232 Football
team owners were losing money because of “soaring player salaries and
intense bidding wars” that poached players from other teams.233
227. See Baglio, supra note 191, at 2264 (quoting PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, PLAYING FOR
DOLLARS: LABOR RELATIONS AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 8 (1996)).
228. Id. at 2265.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. History 1911–1920, NFL (2016), http://www.nfl.com/history/chronology/1911-1920
[http://perma.cc/S57H-RF73].
232. Christopher Klein, The Birth of the National Football League, HISTORY (2014),
http://www.history.com/news/the-birth-of-the-national-football- league [http://perma.cc/B3QCR9GR].
233. Id.
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Accordingly, the purpose of this new venture was to “raise the standard of
professional football in every way possible, to eliminate bidding for players
between rival clubs and to secure the cooperation in the formation of
schedule.”234 In other words, the league was created to protect the interests
of the owners.
Decades later, the NFL created the office of the commissioner.235
During the 1960s, the league expanded the power of the commissioner with
the election of the third commissioner of the NFL, Pete Rozelle.236
Essentially, the owners gave Rozelle “full, complete, and final jurisdiction
and authority over any dispute involving a member or members in the
League.”237 The commissioner’s discretion has further widened today
because he now has the power to punish a player for conduct that he
considers “detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game
of professional football.”238 However, the commissioner’s power is limited
in that he must answer to the owners because they hold the power to
remove him.239
The NFL also consists of a Competition Committee (the
“Committee”) which approves any change in game rules, league policy,
club ownership, or other modification to the game. 240 Essentially, the
Committee leads the rule-making process.241 When deciding what
regulatory modifications to make, other interests are represented and heard
because the Committee receives input from its coaches’ and general
managers’ subcommittees, experts, clubs, players, league committees, the
234. Id.
235. See NFL Commissioners and Presidents, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME (Jan. 1,
2005),
http://www.profootballhof.com/news/nfl-commissioners-and-presidents/
[http://perma.cc/G8F6-D6UZ].
236. Id.
237. Constitution and Bylaws of the National Football League, NFL (2006),
http://www.nfl.com/static/content/public/static/html/careers/pdf/co_.pdf [http://perma.cc/XVW89B52].
238. Id.
239. League
Governance,
NFL
FOOTBALL
OPERATIONS,
http://operations.nfl.com/football-ops/league-governance/ [http://perma.cc/RX3M-37XS].
240. Id.
241. The
NFL
Competition
Committee,
NFL
FOOTBALL
OPERATIONS,
http://operations.nfl.com/football-ops/league-governance/the-nfl-competition-committee/
[http://perma.cc/G8F6-D6UZ].
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NFL Players Association, and others sources.242
Afterwards, the
Committee holds a national meeting to discuss the feedback it received,
among other things, and reviews information with league medical advisors,
members of the coaches’ and general managers’ subcommittees and NFL
Players Association representatives.243 After further review at the annual
meeting, the Committee presents a report of its findings to all owners, who
then vote on any proposed rules or rule changes.244 Adoptions of a new
rule or a revision of an existing rule must have the support of seventy-five
percent of the owners.245
The players’ interests are further represented through the National
Football League Player’s Association (“NFLPA”). The NFLPA represents
players’ financial interests by playing a key role in renewing of collective
bargaining agreements, among other things.246 It provides insight and
feedback to the Committee regarding player protection during the rulemaking process.247
Additionally, the league has created regulations that protect the
owners’ interests, such as “the salary cap,” which promotes fair
competition by limiting the amount each team can spend on player’s
salaries.248 Further, the Commissioner may protect the owners’ interests
and those of the sport by exercising his power to discipline “an owner,
shareholder, partner or holder of an interest in a member club . . . [who] has
either violate[d] the Constitution and Bylaws of the League or professional
football.”249 Moreover, bargaining with the NFLPA has granted discretion
to the league’s Commissioner by allowing him to punish conduct, including
criminal conduct, that affects “the integrity of, or public confidence in, the
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Michael Lydakis & Andrew Zapata, Tackling the Issues: The History of the National
Football League’s 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement and What It Means for the Future of
the Sport, WILLAMETTE SPORTS L. REV. 17, 19–32 (2012).
247. The NFL Competition Committee, supra note 241.
248. Louis Bien, The 2015 NFL Salary Cap Explained, SB NATION (Mar. 2, 2015, 5:52
PM),
http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2015/3/2/8134891/nfl-salary-cap-2015-franchise-tagexplained [http://perma.cc/G554-VJY7].
249. Constitution and Bylaws of the National Football League, supra note 237.
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game of professional football.”250 This broad discretion is premised on two
justifications: the conduct’s harm to the sport’s image and profitability.251
These reasons explain why the Commissioner had the power to discipline
Michael Vick for his involvement in dogfighting and gambling252 and his
power to discipline Tom Brady for his involvement in the “Deflategate”
scandal.253 However, the Deflategate scandal has placed limits on the
Commissioner’s unfettered discretion. After Brady and his employer
challenged the commissioner’s ruling, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota vacated the ruling, thereby calling into question the
commissioner’s partiality.254
While a centralized governing body such as a sports league seems to
be the best solution for the corruptive ills of boxing since it has been
proven effective in major professional team sports leagues,255 not much has
been discussed as to how such a body will operate and be structured. The
sole purpose of having a governing body in boxing would be to manage the
sport: create rules and regulations, enforce these rules and regulations along
with existing law, and impose penalties if ignored. To effectively combat
corruption, the structure of such a private league must contain a balance of
powers, meaning that the interests of all participating parties must be
represented and heard. Therefore, because the sole purpose in creating a
centralized governing body would be to manage the sport, enforcement
would most likely not be overlooked and fair practices and treatment would
be assured.256 Moreover, because a private league will have a structure that
represents and protects the interests of all parties, the league will be self250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. The “Deflategate” scandal alleged that the New England Patriots deflated the
footballs used in the American Football Conference (AFC) Championship game. Rachel G.
Bowers, What is the ‘Deflategate’ Controversy?, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 20, 2015),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2015/01/20/what-deflategate/z0DJ1t5cmjeliqGLvSiu3L/story.html [http://perma.cc/4XC2-DQW3].
254.
Five’s
a
Trend,
ECONOMIST (Sept.
10,
2015,
10:00
PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/gametheory/2015/09/player-discipline-american-football
[http://perma.cc/4WDP-MJRX].
255. Burstein, supra note 194, at 494; see Baglio, supra note 191, at 2296; Jurek, supra
note 189, at 1226. See generally Ehrlichman, supra note 188, at 455.
256. Burstein, supra note 194, at 496.
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enforcing since it will incentivize those involved to properly oversee the
sport.
Indeed, it is true that boxing is different from other major sports in the
United States in that it is not a team sport;257 however, the fact that boxing
is not a team sport does not warrant complete dismissal of adapting certain
aspects of such team sports’ organizational structures.258 Nevertheless,
because boxing is an individual sport like golf, the Professional Golfers’
Association of America (“PGA”) may serve as a better organizational
model.259 Thus, to achieve the primary purpose mentioned above, the sport
of boxing could adopt the PGA’s organizational structure as well as aspects
of team sports’ structure provided that the structure adequately addresses
the needs and interests of all participants.
1. The Mechanics and Templates
As a template, those in the sport of boxing may choose from two
structures: the PGA Tour or the PGA of America.260 The PGA Tour’s
structure consists of a board called the Player Advisory Council (“PAC”),
directors known as the Policy Board, and the Commissioner.261 The Policy
Board’s responsibility is to govern and control the sport262 by promulgating
rules, regulations, and penalties it deems in the best interests of the sport.263
257. See id. at 494–95.
258. See generally id. at 494.
259. Id. at 495.
260. The PGA Tour and the PGA of America were once one association until they split in
1968. Now the PGA Tour is an association in which the members play cumulatively in tours.
The players of the PGA of America, on the other hand, “often do play competitively, but
primarily are the people who run the golf industry daily by using their expertise in the game to
service the needs of their customers and/or membership, run facilities, teach, and generally be
leaders in the industry.” PGA of America v. PGA Tour, PGA S. CENT. SECTION ARK. CHAPTER
(Sept.
14,
2011),
http://arkansaspga.com/2011/09/14/pga-of-america-vs-pga-tour/
[http://perma.cc/9PSX-8CRW].
261. The structure also includes a deputy commissioner and officers; however, for the
purposes of this section they do not play a major role. Id.
262. Tour Golfers, PGA Settle Fuss over Tournament Control, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW
15 (Dec. 14, 1968) [http://perma.cc/95CM-2NM8].
263. See generally 2015–2016 PGA Tour: Player Handbook & Tournament Regulations,
PGA
TOUR,
http://playersupport.pgatourhq.com/Tour/PLP/playersupportinforegistration.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/d
omino/OpenAttachment/Tour/PLP/playersupportinforegistration.nsf/C727DB7A7733806285257
CC50066F582/pgAttachments/2015-
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The Policy Board consists of four player directors serving three-year terms,
one PGA of America director, and four volunteer independent directors
who are among the nation’s leading businessmen.264 Professional golfers
who play in fifteen or more regular PGA Tour events in a year have voting
rights to elect the player directors.265 However, the candidates that
professional golfers may vote for come from a slate of candidates chosen
by the existing player directors.266 Preceding independent directors elect
the succeeding independent directors.267
The PAC consists of sixteen members, each serving a one-year
term.268 Eight of the sixteen PAC members are appointed by the player
directors from the Policy Board and the remaining eight are elected by vote
of the general membership.269 The PAC “works with, advises, and consults
the PGA Tour Policy Board and commissioner Tim Finchem on various
issues facing the PGA Tour and its membership.”270 Because of the role
the PAC plays, the fact that members of the PGA Tour are able to vote in
PAC members, combined with the absence of a players’ union, means that
players must solely rely on the PAC as well as the Policy Board to
represent their interests on issues with the Commissioner and his staff.271
16%20PGA%20TOUR%20Handbook%20&%20Regulations%20-%20Final.pdf
[http://perma.cc/KR5K-7846].
264. Id.
265. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (D. Or. 1998).
266. Id. at 1320 n.4 (stating that whenever the office of any player director becomes
vacant, either by death, resignation, disqualification, or removal, if he is no longer a voting
member of the PGA Tour, the remaining player directors shall elect a successor who will serve
for the remaining time of the predecessor); see 2015–2016 PGA Tour: Player Handbook &
Tournament Regulations, supra note 262, at 163–65.
267. See Tim Rosaforte, What’s Behind the PGA Tour Policy Board, GOLF DIGEST,
http://www.golfdigest.com/story/gw20080201rosaforte [http://perma.cc/HD4F-62FZ].
See
generally AT&T CEO to Join PGA Tour Policy Board, GOLF CHANNEL (Dec. 8, 2011, 3:00 PM),
http://www.golfchannel.com/news/golftalkcentral/att-ceo-join-pga-tour-policy-board/
1/3
[http://perma.cc/HD4F-62FZ].
268.
PGA Tour Announces Advisory Board, ESPN (Jan. 17, 2015),
http://espn.go.com/golf/story/_/id/12183876/pga-tour-announces-16-players-fill-player-advisorycouncil-2015 [http://perma.cc/23D4-U5S7].
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Rosaforte, supra note 267.
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The Commissioner’s responsibility is to interpret and apply the
regulations set forth by the Policy Board: “[h]is job is to hire a staff and
make sure the directives of the [Policy] [B]oard are followed.”272 A search
committee made up of the Policy Board’s independent directors elects the
Commissioner.273 Any complaint regarding the violation of rules or
regulations are first filed with the PAC.274 If the PAC decides that the
complaints are important enough, they are discussed and ultimately passed
on to the Policy Board.275
The Chief of Operations, who is part of the Commissioner’s office,
presents a notice to the member who is the subject of the complaint unless
the notice is of a proposed major penalty (in which case the Commissioner
executes it).276 The member must then submit a proposed disciplinary
action, penalty facts, or evidence of mitigating circumstances that may
apply to the Commissioner within fourteen days of such notice.277 Within
fourteen days of receiving the information from the member, the
“Commissioner shall notify the member in writing of the imposition of the
proposed disciplinary action or penalty, or that the proposed action has
been dismissed.”278 After the imposition of either a disciplinary action or
penalty, the member may appeal to the Appeals Committee, which consists
of non-player directors designated by the Policy Board.279
The PGA of America has a different and simpler organizational and
disciplinary structure. The structure consists of a board of directors, a
board of control, and a board of inquiry.280 In the PGA of America,
complaints are filed with the Board of Inquiry, who then could further
272. Rosaforte, supra note 267; see 2015–2016 PGA Tour: Player Handbook &
Tournament Regulations, supra note 263.
273. See Rosaforte, supra note 267.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. 2015–2016 PGA Tour: Player Handbook & Tournament Regulations, supra note
263, at 150.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 151.
279. Id.
280. The PGA of America does elect executive officers; however, for the purposes of this
section, executive officers are not relevant.
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investigate the issue and report it to the Board of Control.281 The Board of
Control consists of the Secretary of the Association and four members of
the association appointed by the President according to geography.282 The
Board of Control may hear complaints filed with the association and
appeals from any other decisions made by the association.283
The Board of Directors consists of three officers: the President, a
Player Director elected by the Player Directors of the PGA Tour, Directors
representing each of the Association’s Districts, and two Independent
Directors.284 The Board of Directors, like the Policy Board of the PGA
Tour, is responsible for the promulgation of rules, policies, and regulation
of the association and its members.285 However, unlike the Policy Board
but like the Commissioner of the PGA Tour, the Board of Directors is
responsible for the management of the association and has the power to
interpret its rules, regulations, policies, and even the constitution and
bylaws of the association.286 Moreover, the Board of Directors “has the
jurisdiction to hear appeals that arise from decisions of the Board of
Control.”287 Decisions by the Board of Directors are final.288
2. Proposed Models
Given that boxing is not organized in the exact same way as golf, the
sport of boxing should adopt a variation of the two PGA structures.
Similarly, because boxing is not a team sport, a league structure suitable for
boxing should not be identical to the private leagues of professional team
sports.289 Moreover, to avoid doubts regarding partiality, boxing should
281. Constitution Bylaws and Regulations, THE PROFESSIONAL GOLFER’S ASSOCIATION
AMERICA
11
(2013),
http://pdf.pgalinks.com/regmemos/2013_Constitution_Bylaws_Regulations.pdf
[http://perma.cc/B55Y-T34R].
OF

282. Id. at 1.
283. Id. at 40.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. 2015–2016 PGA Tour: Player Handbook & Tournament Regulations, supra note
262, at 151.
288. Constitution Bylaws and Regulations, supra note 281, at 40.
289. Burstein, supra note 194, at 494.
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not strictly adhere to the NFL’s structure.290 Additionally, although it was
mentioned that the “best of all possible worlds would have” both a central
governing body and a union,291 unions have proven to be at times
ineffective and harmful to some sports and their fans, sometimes causing
lockouts and work stoppages in the NBA, MLB, and NFL.292
Despite boxing’s lack of boxer organization, boxers’ interests may
still be represented in a centralized governing body through the adaptation
of a player council (the “Council”) similar to the PAC of the PGA Tour.
Should such a structure be adopted, the boxers participating in the
association should have voting rights that would allow them to elect the
Council’s members. Therefore, the Council will serve to work in the best
interests of the fighters. Moreover, unlike the PAC in the PGA Tour, the
Council should be allowed to choose some of its members from among the
association’s general membership. This way, the concerns of all members
are adequately heard and the voices of journeymen boxers are not
overshadowed by the voices of premiere boxers.
Additionally, boxing should adopt a board of directors who, like both
the PGA of America’s Board of Directors and the PGA Tour’s Policy
Board, promulgates rules, regulations, and penalties it deems in the best
interests of the sport. Boxing can strictly follow the same structure as the
PGA Tour by allowing the board of directors to consist of player directors
who are elected by premier boxers. The remaining board members could
be independent directors, as in the PGA Tour. However, to adequately
address the interests of all participants of the sport, some of the board
members should be elected by managers and promoters, who will be
members of the association as well. Thus, the board of directors would be
comprised of members that represent the interests of boxers, managers, and
promoters when promulgating and enforcing regulations.
With respect to disciplinary authority, it could either be conferred to a
commissioner, like the PGA Tour, or to a board of control, like the PGA of
America. If the former option is adopted, boxers can appeal to a committee
to review the decisions of the board of directors or to an outside arbitrator,

290. See supra Part V.B.
291. Burstein, supra note 194, at 494.
292. See generally Pro Sports Lockouts and Strikes Fast Facts, CNN LIBRARY, (Jan. 28,
2015, 9:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/us/pro-sports-lockouts-and-strikes-fast-facts/
[http://perma.cc/QW6Z-G3G6].
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like in the NBA.293 However, for a more fair and disinterested decision, an
outside arbitrator would be the better of the two options unless the appeals
committee is comprised of disinterested officers. If instead a board of
control is given disciplinary authority, jurisdiction to hear appeals should
then be conferred to either the board of directors, an appeals committee, or
neutral third party arbitration while possibly including a board of inquiries
for investigatory purposes. To prevent a “floodgate” effect, like in the
PGA of America and the NBA, formal complaints should only be filed if
probable cause exists. Like the NBA, the standard of review for appeals
should be the “arbitrary and capricious” standard.294
VI. CONCLUSION
Deceptive and corruptive practices are harmful not only to their
intended targets but also to innocent bystanders. Corruption, whether it be
in an attempt to monopolize the sport or circumvent health and safety
protections for boxers, hurts the interests of boxers, promoters, managers,
as well as boxing fans and the sport in general. If a manager limits his
fighters’ choice of promoter, as in the two cases brought against Haymon,
the manager is interfering with fair competition while at the same time
depriving the fighter of promotional and financial opportunities. Moreover,
the manager is possibly preventing the anticipated matches from occurring.
Additionally, bringing a lawsuit and going to trial is expensive. Court
fees, witness expenses, and attorney’s fees, among other things, make up
the cost. Thus, it is safe to say that both the Golden Boy and Top Rank
lawsuits against Haymon have not been cheap and the trial expenses will be
hefty. This is money that is not only taken away from wealthy promoters
but also from future investments in boxing. Moreover, if the remainder of
allegations set forth in both complaints are true, boxing fans, promoters,
managers, and boxers have all been deprived of boxing opportunities and
matches. In short, if Haymon had engaged in venue blocking, used the
music industry’s “payola” practices, and included tie-out provisions in
contracts, he prevented matches involving other promoters from occurring

293. James M. Pollack, Note, Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner “Best
Interests” Disciplinary Authority in Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1645, 1646–49
(1999).
294. See, e.g., Code of Ethics Bylaws and Regulations, THE PROFESSIONAL GOLFERS’
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 1, 3 http://pdf.pgalinks.com/regmemos/CodeofEthicsGuidelines.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3EC7-7MG2]; Pollack, supra note 293, at 1703–04.
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and deprived boxers from opportunities and fans from enjoying potential
matches.
A private governing body like the one this Note proposes would
mitigate the unfair practices and corruptive ills that penetrate the sport of
boxing.295 Such a private league would be unlike the solutions proposed by
other legal scholars.296 This private governing body would effectively deal
with corruption by combating it on all fronts, having the enforcement
power that the Ali Act lacks, and existing as a proper policing and
oversight system that disciplines behavior before it creates harm. 297 The
representation of every league participant’s interest in the league’s internal
structure and regulations would serve as an incentive to ensure that all
aspects of corruptive conduct are properly dealt with, prevented, or
redressed.298 The governing body would be an avenue where injured
parties could redress the harm they have suffered.299 Moreover, the
governing body would continuously promulgate rules and laws that deal
with emerging issues and new forms of corruption.300
In acting in the best interests of all participants and the sport, if such a
private league had been in place during the occurrence of these allegations
against Haymon, the private league would have either prevented such
conduct from reoccurring or mitigated the harm that flowed from such
conduct. As mentioned, three months after Top Rank filed their complaint,
the court dismissed it for failure to state damages. The answer to whether
Top Rank did in fact sustain damages from Haymon’s conduct, however,
would not have impeded a private league from pursuing disciplinary action
and ceasing Haymon’s practices. If a private league were in place, Top
Rank would not need to amend its complaint for failure to state damages.
The damages were clear: Haymon’s conduct robbed boxers, managers,
promoters, and fans from potential bouts and it further tarnished the
quality, creditability, and integrity of the sport.

295. See supra Part V.B.2.
296. See supra Part IV.
297. See supra Part IV.
298. See supra Part IV.
299. See supra Part V.B.2.
300. Id.

